Georgia’s Warning for Ukraine

After months of failed efforts by Washington to bring Russia to the negotiating table, planning for what comes after the war in Ukraine may seem counterintuitive. But eventually, the war will end, and when it does, the United States and its European allies will need to be prepared. The day after, Moscow will continue to threaten Ukraine’s sovereignty and meddle in its internal affairs, and the West will need to have a strategy for dealing with that. If the United States and Europe proceed to normalize relations with Moscow without swiftly integrating Ukraine into Western institutions and providing real security guarantees, it could lead to further military and gray-zone interventions by Russia and the gradual erosion of Ukrainian democracy.

This is a phenomenon the world has witnessed before—in the aftermath of a previous Russian war of aggression. After Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, the West made many of these very mistakes. Although that war was much shorter, lasting all of five days, the way it was concluded holds important lessons for what could happen to Ukraine if a cease-fire or an agreement to end the war is not followed by a more comprehensive plan to secure the country’s future.

Like Ukraine today, Georgia in 2008 was a pro-Western democracy that appeared to be on a slow but steady trajectory toward EU integration and NATO membership. U.S. President George W. Bush once called the country “a beacon of liberty for the region and the world.” After the Russian invasion, the European Union and the United States stepped up to broker a cease-fire, but they did not impose sanctions or any other major consequences on Russia. On the contrary, they chose to prioritize normalizing relations with Moscow, with U.S. President Barack Obama seeking a “reset” of ties in 2009 and essentially giving Russian President Vladimir Putin a pass for launching the first European war of the 21st century.

Moreover, the United States and Europe failed to provide security guarantees to Georgia or to fast-track EU and NATO membership. As a result, Georgia remained vulnerable to creeping annexation and political manipulation by Moscow. Today, the once-hopeful nation is farther from the West and more exposed to the Kremlin’s malign influence than at any other point since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Washington and its European allies would do well to study the example of Georgia to understand why a postwar plan for Ukraine is so vital.

FALSE PRETEXTS, FALSE PROMISES

As with its war in Ukraine, Russia’s aggression against Georgia was years in the making. After Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, the country’s democratic transformation presented a problem for Moscow. As a former Soviet republic that successfully broke away from Russia’s orbit and emerged as a rapidly developing democracy, Georgia offered other former Eastern-bloc countries a powerful alternative to Russia’s authoritarian model.

In 2006, Moscow sought to punish Tbilisi by imposing embargoes on Russian imports of Georgian wine and mineral water and cutting off supplies of Russian oil and gas on which Georgia was highly dependent. When those measures failed to derail Georgia’s Western trajectory, Moscow shifted tactics. Russian forces restricted international monitoring of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, regions of Georgia where Moscow backed separatist movements and where it had long maintained “peacekeepers.” The Kremlin also expanded its program to distribute Russian passports in those territories and signed off on the legal acts of the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Military provocations intensified, including airspace intrusions and missile attacks on Georgian villages. Each violation became a test of Western resolve. For the most part, the United States and Europe proved unwilling or unable to draw clear red lines or impose penalties, signaling to the Kremlin that it could escalate without consequence.

In August 2008, after months of calibrated and mounting provocations, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Georgia. More than 80,000 Russian troops crossed the border, overwhelming Georgian forces within days. Russian airstrikes targeted military and civilian infrastructure, pushing deep into Georgian territory. The offensive consolidated Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, securing 20 percent of Georgia’s internationally recognized territory, a reality that endures to this day.

The invasion came just four months after a NATO summit in Bucharest, at which the alliance declared that Georgia and Ukraine would one day become members but failed to offer either of them a Membership Action Plan. Moscow interpreted this ambiguity as evidence that the West was unwilling to defend Georgia and that the country remained strategically exposed. It also justified its assault by claiming it was protecting South Ossetia from Georgian “aggression” and “genocide” and defending Russian citizens, having distributed passports en masse to residents of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia since the early 2000s. (In reality, Moscow had backed, armed, and financed the separatists in both regions since the early 1990s, systematically undermining Georgia’s sovereignty.) Despite its stated focus on South Ossetia, Russia simultaneously opened a second front from Abkhazia, expanding its military operations across Georgia’s western flank.

Georgia’s democratic transformation presented a problem for Moscow.

In the months leading up to the invasion, Russia conducted large-scale military exercises dubbed Caucasus 2008 near the border with Georgia. It also left combat units stationed in the vicinity, deployed paratroopers, and sent railway troops into Abkhazia. An independent fact-finding mission on the conflict commissioned by the EU noted the presence of Russian regular armed forces in Abkhazia beyond their peacekeeping mandate and confirmed that Russian combat troops who engaged in Caucasus 2008 had crossed into South Ossetia as hostilities began. During the conflict, hundreds of Georgians were killed and tens of thousands were displaced permanently.

The initial cease-fire agreement, brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy on August 12, 2008, was deliberately vague, omitting any mechanisms for enforcing a truce. The deal proved inadequate to stop Russia’s advance toward Tbilisi. Only with meaningful U.S. engagement did the situation begin to shift. On August 13, flanked by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in the White House Rose Garden, Bush delivered an address condemning Russia’s aggression. He announced the launch of a humanitarian mission involving the U.S. military and warned Russia to “cease all military activities in Georgia and withdraw its forces that entered Georgia in recent days.” The statement, signaling a more assertive U.S. stance, finally helped stall Russia’s advance toward Tbilisi.

Two days later, Rice arrived in Tbilisi to meet with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and other Georgian leaders and address weak points in the cease-fire agreement. Chief among these was a provision that, while calling for a Russian troop withdrawal to positions held before the outbreak of hostilities, allowed Russian forces to implement unspecified “additional security measures” until international monitors could be deployed. The Georgian side had warned Sarkozy that Moscow had deliberately inserted this phrase to allow continued Russian military operations beyond the administrative boundaries of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In response to these concerns, and with Rice’s direct engagement, Sarkozy issued an official letter addressed to the presidents of both Georgia and Russia specifying that any additional Russian security measures were to be strictly limited in scope and permitted only within a narrow zone a few kilometers from the two regions’ borders. The letter also stated that such measures were to be carried out only by peacekeepers at previously agreed levels and that all other Russian forces were to withdraw to the positions they had held as of August 7. Moreover, these measures were to remain in effect only until an international peacekeeping force could be deployed.

On September 15 of that year, the EU established the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia to verify the implementation of the cease-fire agreement, promote stability, and build confidence between the parties, beginning on October 1. Ever since, Russia has consistently blocked these EU monitors from gaining access to the occupied regions, directly contradicting the spirit and letter of the accord. This refusal to cooperate has also allowed Moscow to further militarize and consolidate its control over Georgian territory. Indeed, within weeks of the cease-fire, Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, defying both the terms of the agreement and core principles of international law. As in earlier frozen conflicts, Russia’s continued military occupation of these regions has served to undermine Georgia’s security, weaken its economy, and block its path toward Euro-Atlantic integration.

A CAUTIONARY TALE

For Western leaders, the 2008 pact was a way to repair their rifts with Russia. Within months, Europe resumed formal ties with Moscow and prioritized energy and trade—Germany with the Nord Stream pipeline agreement, France with the $1.3 billion Mistral warship deal—rewarding rather than punishing the aggressor. Then, in 2009, the Obama administration launched its reset, aimed at stabilizing relations with Moscow through high-stakes diplomacy, arms control, cooperation on Iran, and economic integration. In return for offering limited, short-lived cooperation, Russia gained legitimacy and leverage. In the years that followed, Moscow would in fact abandon arms control agreements while using its membership in the World Trade Organization to strengthen the Russian economy. What Washington and Brussels framed as pragmatism instead emboldened the Kremlin, helping to lay the groundwork for its serial aggression in Ukraine.

Equally consequential if largely overlooked was the failure of Western governments to help Georgia build deterrence and institutional resilience. Although Western leaders maintained strong rhetorical support for Georgia’s sovereignty, they made no serious effort to upgrade security cooperation with Tbilisi. There was no transfer of defense capabilities, no NATO Membership Action Plan, and certainly no security guarantees. Georgia was left politically supported but strategically exposed.

As the Kremlin saw it, the cease-fire was never a step toward peace but simply a tactical pause. The absence of Western support allowed Russia to steadily expand its presence, erecting fences, redrawing boundaries, and inching deeper into Georgian-held territory. And over time, Moscow’s assault shifted from the military front to the political one, with a barrage of cyberattacks, espionage, and disinformation campaigns aimed at Tbilisi. In 2012, Moscow began backing Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire with deep financial ties to Russia, in his campaign to gradually capture Georgia’s political institutions. In the dozen years since, his Georgian Dream party has ruled the country with an increasingly iron fist.

Over two decades, Georgia has been reduced to an authoritarian state aligned with the Kremlin.

At first, the party professed a commitment to the country’s Euro-Atlantic path even as it gradually eroded democratic institutions and tightened ties with Moscow. Over time, Georgian Dream secured control of the national election commission and stocked the state bureaucracy, law enforcement, and the judiciary with loyalists despite significant popular opposition.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine shattered the party’s façade. Although Georgia’s people overwhelmingly supported Ukraine, Georgian Dream refused to confront Moscow, instead enabling the Russian war effort by allowing Georgia to become a route for sanctions circumvention and imports. Meanwhile, Brussels responded to the invasion by accelerating the process for integrating Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine into the EU. This development threatened Georgian Dream’s grip on power. Faced with the offer of genuine EU membership, a prospect that would require democratic reforms and accountability, Georgia Dream pivoted to sabotage by enacting changes that would undermine the country’s candidacy.

In May 2024, Georgia’s parliament passed a Russian-style law labeling many civil society organizations and media outlets as “foreign agents.” In October, Georgian Dream declared victory in a parliamentary election marred by irregularities and credible allegations of fraud. Two months later, the party suspended accession talks with the EU. Despite repression, hundreds of thousands of Georgians took to the streets, demanding a democratic future and genuine Euro-Atlantic integration. As these protests continue, leading opposition figures have been imprisoned, and the government continues to put relentless pressure on civil society and independent media organizations. The country that Bush hailed as a beacon of liberty in 2005 has been reduced to an authoritarian state aligned with the Kremlin—a cautionary tale for Ukraine and every other post-Soviet state that Putin wants to see reintegrated back into Russia’s sphere of influence.

STRENGTH IN UNITY

For Europe and the United States, Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia was a missed wake-up call. At the time, Western governments did not recognize that it was part of a larger Russian campaign to dismantle the post–Cold War order. The war exposed not only Russia’s determination to unravel the rules-based international order but also the West’s paralysis in the face of it: the United States and its NATO allies failed to support Georgia and hold Russia accountable for its actions.

If there were any lingering illusions that Russia would not attempt a similar act of aggression, they evaporated when Russia mounted its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This time, Russia’s gambit was far bigger: for the first time in decades, Washington was compelled to confront Moscow through sustained military, economic, and political means. Yet despite the extensive sanctions imposed against Russia and the billions of dollars of military support provided to Ukraine, the transatlantic response remained more focused on countering Moscow’s moves than on shaping the strategic direction of the conflict. Three years into the war, a new U.S. administration’s push for cease-fire talks has laid bare the sobering reality that neither Washington nor Brussels ever articulated a viable endgame.

For the United States, the greatest risk in negotiating with Russia to end the war is to enter such talks without clear objectives, a consolidated political will, and a contingency plan. The process will play directly into Moscow’s hands unless Washington can forcefully define an enduring goal and outline a concrete strategy for what it will do if talks collapse. Negotiations must not follow Russia’s timeline or terms. Cease-fires cannot be treated as bridges to peace unless they are anchored in a broader strategy for long-term security, backed by credible deterrence and a readiness to act if diplomacy fails.

For diplomacy to succeed in Ukraine, it must be grounded in the recognition that Putin won’t stop unless he is made to stop. A cease-fire that locks in Russia’s territorial gains, lacks binding timelines, imposes constraints on the victim rather than the aggressor, and hinges on vague promises of sustainable peace will only confirm that Moscow’s revisionist strategy still works.

Only by providing meaningful security guarantees to Ukraine can the United States and its European allies break this cycle. For Kyiv, NATO membership remains the most effective and economical guarantee of security—not only for Ukraine but also for NATO itself. Short of offering immediate membership, alliance members must enable Ukraine’s military to develop to a level that ensures that it can deter future aggression on its own, supported by formal agreements guaranteeing its air defense. Boosting Ukraine’s defense industry, ensuring a continued presence of Western military trainers and monitors, and embedding the country’s armed forces within NATO’s operational structures will be critical. Effective recovery and reconstruction will be equally essential for Ukraine’s resilience. That means mobilizing frozen Russian assets for rebuilding Ukraine while also integrating the country into Western supply chains, protecting its rare mineral resources, and anchoring it firmly and irreversibly within the Euro-Atlantic economic and security architecture. Anything less risks repeating the aftermath of the 2008 war in Georgia, when the West’s desire for calm rewarded Russian aggression and left a Western-bound democracy out in the cold.

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