With anti-ESG forces ascendant in national government, and federal agencies neglecting or outright reversing even modest regulatory efforts to address climate risks, fossil-fuel industry supporters have expanded their agenda at the state level. Through 100+ statehouse bills introduced this year, the anti-ESG agenda has moved beyond an initial targeting of investors and financial institutions aligned on mitigating climate concerns, to pursue a rollback of procedural rights surrounding shareholder engagement and access to capital that could constrain climate risk efforts more broadly. This post covers those evolving state-level tactics.
New Anti-ESG Legislation Includes Misleading “Debanking” Bills
Pleiades Strategy’s annual Statehouse Report, released in July, identifies 106 anti-ESG bills introduced in 32 states this year, with 11 passed by legislatures, and nine already signed into law by governors. These anti-ESG measures undermine sensible risk-return analysis by public-sector pension funds and procurement offices, and/or by private-sector banking and finance. Still, the vast majority of anti-ESG bills fail nationwide, most often in the face of opposition from the business community. However, recent anti-ESG state-level legislation has evolved in response to past failures, with its proponents now crafting less extreme but nonetheless impactful proposals.
One prominent new tactic is to strategically frame these bills as civil-rights initiatives to combat so-called discriminatory “debanking” campaigns against potential clients. Discriminatory banking in the U.S. has long consisted of financial institutions withholding adequate services for individuals and communities based on their racial and ethnic profiles. During the New Deal era, for example, federal government maps “redlined” whole neighborhoods as high-risk for home mortgages, based on any number of ostensible factors, but consistently stigmatizing black residents. By contrast, today’s bills designed to combat purported debanking practices would constrain the U.S. banking and finance sectors from determining for themselves whether they wish to become entangled in risky enterprises related to fossil-fuel production, gun-manufacturing, and the promotion of controversial social values.
The Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) has modeled over 20 of these so-called “access to basic financial services” bills. Simultaneously, ADF is collaborating on a neutral-sounding Viewpoint Diversity Score business index with the asset-management firm Inspire Investing, which prides itself on “only provid[ing] biblically responsible investing services,” while “screen[ing] out of the portfolio—abortion, adult entertainment, LGBT activism and the like.” Inspire Investing’s website recommends that “if we had to choose between higher returns with immoral investments, or lower returns with God glorifying investments we should, without hesitation, joyfully choose the option that glorifies God no matter what the returns.” In stark contrast to these bold entwinements of investment advice and pointed social-issue advocacy, ESG proponents today often find themselves subject to “greenhushing” silencing effects, whether or not they adopt a purely financial perspective when calling for realistic accounting of climate risk.
At the national level, President Trump’s August 7th Executive Order on Guaranteeing Fair Banking for All Americans echoes state legislators’ anti-ESG rhetoric by asserting that banking and lending institutions have “engaged in unacceptable practices to restrict law-abiding individuals’ and businesses’ access to financial services on the basis of political or religious beliefs or lawful business activities.” The Executive Order directs all federal banking regulators to swiftly eliminate from their operations any “use of reputation risk or equivalent concepts that could result in politicized or unlawful debanking.” It also orders these offices to review any financial institutions that have engaged in such practices, and to impose fines or other disciplinary measures.
New Tactics Focused on Shareholder Process
Another novel threat to the transparent analysis and disclosure of climate risk involves limiting shareholders’ capacity to participate on an informed basis in corporate decision-making. At the federal level, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in February rescinded its previous guidance on no-action requests, reintroducing expanded grounds for corporations to exclude a shareholder’s proposal from their proxy statement. State efforts to curtail shareholder participation vary. Sometimes, state legislation frames these restrictions as content-neutral procedural reform; other bills openly attack pro-ESG perspectives in ways that clearly contradict constitutional protections.
Delaware’s Senate Bill 21 (SB 21), which became law in March, comes closest to content-neutral technocratic reform, while nonetheless limiting shareholder rights to inspect corporate books and records under Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) section 220. In recent years, shareholders sought access under DGCL 220 to a broad range of corporate communications, including directors’ emails and texts. Under recent Delaware case law, such as AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Lebanon Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund, 243 A.3d 417 (Del. 2020), shareholders’ request to review books and records need only meet the “lowest possible burden of proof” of possessing a proper purpose for investigating potential corporate wrongdoing. However, SB 21 establishes a strong presumption that section 220 provides shareholders with access solely to formal company records, such as traditional financial books and board minutes. For these requests, shareholders must articulate with “reasonable particularity” a proper purpose, and can only seek records “specifically related” to that purpose. Corporations can require an NDA (non-disclosure agreement) on the information obtained. For access to additional documents beyond default norms, shareholders must demonstrate a “compelling need.”
Delaware governor Matt Meyer was unusually proactive in shepherding SB 21 through the legislature, reflecting the broader impact of intense anti-ESG lobbying in the state, and related anxiety that expanded shareholder rights might prompt firms to reincorporate in Texas or other board-friendly states, depriving Delaware of its lucrative status as legal home to the vast majority of large U.S. corporations. From that perspective, SB 21 represents the latest step in a longstanding pattern of statutory modifications by Delaware’s legislature to maintain the state’s centrality to U.S. corporate law: from DGCL 102(b)(7)’s exculpation of corporate fiduciaries from duty of care liability, to statutory constraints on strike-suit litigation challenging merger deals, to 2024 DGCL modifications which allow the contractual waiving of liability for directors and officers who usurp corporate opportunities.
SB 21’s statutory modifications already have provoked several constitutional challenges, for example on separation-of-powers grounds. In June, Delaware’s Chancery Court judge presiding over Rutledge v. Clearway Energy Group LLC, No. 2025-0499-LWW certified for the state’s Supreme Court two constitutional questions regarding SB 21’s new constraints on shareholder access to corporate materials, asking whether the bill divests the Chancery Court of its equitable jurisdiction to make such determinations, and whether the law eliminates causes of action that already have accrued or vested. Roofers Local 149 Pension Fund v. Magnus Holdings Co. Ltd., No. 2025-0466-PAF (Del. Ch. filed May 5, 2025) has raised related constitutional questions, and the state has intervened in both cases.
Taking a more blatantly anti-ESG tack on restricting access to information, Texas’ SB 2337, signed into law by Governor Greg Abbott in June, aims to narrow shareholder participation on pivotal topics facing firms incorporated or headquartered in the state. SB 2337 imposes a disincentivizing disclosure mandate on proxy advisors to label certain types of recommendations as “not provided solely in the financial interest of the shareholders of a company.” The law expressly defines the incorporation of ESG concerns, as well as sustainability scoring, as “non-financial.” (Notably, by contrast, no comparable Texas asset-management regulation would expressly require Inspire Investing to disclose the “non-financial” components of its divestment campaigns against abortion, pornography, or “LGBT activism.”) Under SB 2337, proxy advisors must disclose their weighing of such “non-financial factors” to both clients and covered corporations, and must explain with particularity the bases of their recommendations. Proxy advisors must also notify clients, covered companies, and the state attorney general if they provide advice that is opposed to the company management’s position, or if they recommend different votes for different clients (based, for example, on clients’ distinct investment priorities).
In late July, two prominent proxy advisor firms, Glass Lewis and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), filed separate suits to block implementation of SB 2337, which is scheduled to take effect September 1. The advisor firms argue that the law violates their First Amendment rights, through content/viewpoint discrimination and compelled non-commercial speech (each triggering strict scrutiny, requiring Texas to show a compelling interest for enacting the statute, and that the statute is the least restrictive means possible for Texas to achieve its purpose), and violates their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process (through unconstitutionally vague prohibitions that chill protected speech). Both firms argue that SB 2337 obstructs advisors’ compliance with national fiduciary frameworks for asset managers established under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act) and/or the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). ISS adds that SB 2337 “will do the opposite of protecting shareholders because it is designed to benefit and protect corporate boards and management, to the detriment of shareholders, whose votes serve as an important check and balance…. Texas’s experiment in anti-capitalism thus serves no one.” The Western District of Texas has scheduled an oral hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction for August 28th.
Further restricting shareholders’ rights, Texas’ SB 1057, signed by Governor Abbott in May, allows firms with their principal office in the state to establish higher preliminary thresholds for shareholder proposals than those set under federal securities law. Under SB 1057, a shareholder or group of shareholders seeking to submit a proposal must possess at least 3% of the firms’ voting shares, or shares worth at least $1 million in market value. For these proposals to move forward, shareholders must solicit at least 67% of shares entitled to vote on the proposal. By contrast, under the SEC’s rule 14a-8 on shareholder proposals for proxy statements, shareholders face a minimum ownership requirement of one to three years, and, depending on the length of ownership, a minimum share value requirement between $2,000 and $25,000. Additionally, unlike Texas SB 1057, Rule 14a-8 contains no solicitation requirement. Moreover, SB 1057 covers not only shareholder proposals under rule 14a-8, but also most floor proposals submitted according to a firm’s advance notice provisions.
Where SB 1057 and rule 14a-8 do overlap, key legal questions include whether the federal rule preempts the Texas statute, and whether corporate law’s internal affairs doctrine for choice-of-law conflicts prevails. Professor Ann Lipton, for instance, notes the jurisdictional complexities that would arise if Delaware takes issue with Texas regulating the rights of shareholders of a Delaware-incorporated firm headquartered in Texas. It is worth noting, however, a 2023 speech in which SEC Commissioner Mark Uyeda asserted that “section 14(a) does not specifically preempt state corporate law or even specifically mention shareholder proposals,” whereas “Congress has been very clear in the federal securities laws when it intends to preempt state law, such as in the National Securities Markets Improvement Act or the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act.”
Though the constitutional status of SB 2337 and SB 1057 remains questionable, they echo similar legislation in other states. Kentucky’s SB 183, for example, combines elements of Texas’ two new anti-ESG laws, by imposing burdensome disclosure requirements on proxy advisors, particularly when those advisors oppose board recommendations. SB 183 amends Kentucky law on fiduciary duties owed to state-administered retirement systems, by requiring contracted proxy advisors to document their economic analysis before recommending a vote on a shareholder-sponsored proposal that departs from board preferences. This documented analysis must demonstrate that the proxy advisor’s recommendation solely serves the interests of retirement plan members and beneficiaries. Governor Andy Beshear argued in his veto message that SB 183 undermines the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority’s discretionary mandate, but the state legislature overrode Governor Beshear’s veto.
Nonetheless, advocates of robust shareholder rights to participation can find some solace in a recent Fifth Circuit ruling. In NCPPR v. NAM, the court considered whether and when shareholder proposals included under rule 14a-8 amount to unconstitutionally compelled speech. Kroger, which had faced a contentious National Center for Public Policy Research (NCPPR) proposal to protect viewpoint diversity, received from the SEC a rule 14a-8 no-action letter, allowing the corporation to exclude the proposal because it “relates to, and does not transcend, ordinary business matters.” Kroger ultimately included the proposal in its proxy filings anyway, but the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) intervened in the case to argue that neither federal securities laws nor the First Amendment allow the SEC to use rule 14a-8 to compel a firm to speak on contentious political or social issues “unrelated to its core business or the creation of shareholder value,” issues that supposedly include climate change. This broad formulation for permissible exclusions could have drastically limited shareholders’ capacity to engage with boards, management, and fellow shareholders through a proposal process that often effectively identifies ongoing or future risks that a firm faces. In November 2024, a Fifth Circuit panel found that the case was moot because NCPPR already had received the relief it sought, and the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the SEC’s informal and nonbinding no-action letter. In May 2025, the Fifth Circuit denied en banc review of the panel’s decision, setting aside the need to rule on NAM’s expansive formulation for restricting shareholder actions.
Anti-ESG Legislation Faces Slow Legal Resolution
Each of the above-mentioned efforts to rein in shareholders’, asset managers’, or banking institutions’ reasonable considerations of climate risk brings its own imminent impact. Shareholders approach the upcoming proxy season uncertain, for instance, whether new restrictions they face will survive legal challenge, and how such state-level constraints apply in relation to federal law. Longer-term decisions on corporate capital expenditures likewise await clarity on the role of shareholder input, shareholder advising, and asset-management sustainability initiatives. Yet even with looming implementation dates, such as September 1 for Texas’ SB 2337, interested parties await judicial clarity. Absent an injunction, proxy advisers operating in Texas will confront a situation similar to Delaware shareholders grappling with that state’s SB 21—forced to mount a prolonged constitutional challenge while navigating operative legal restrictions.
Today’s targeted parties, moreover, must reckon with the fact that related litigation challenging earlier waves of anti-ESG legislation is still making its way through the courts. Most notably, one of the first prominent anti-ESG bills, Texas’ SB 13, passed in 2021, was challenged by the American Sustainable Business Council (ASBC), and remains pending in federal district court (W.D. Tex.). The law prohibits state entities from investing in (or contracting with) companies that “boycott fossil fuels.” ASBC argues that SB 13 infringes on its First Amendment freedoms of speech and association (through content/viewpoint discrimination, as well as compelled speech to certify alignment with Texas’ energy policies), and is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. A hearing on the motions to dismiss and for summary judgment was held in June. The parties await a decision from the court.
Overall, while the Trump administration weaponizes banking, finance, and asset-management regulation, many statehouses continue to incubate further threats to reasonable climate-risk considerations, rather than providing refuge for informed, future-oriented conversations among investors, lenders, and corporations. Justice Brandeis famously characterized state governments as laboratories of democracy. Advocates of realistically addressing climate risk might consider these anti-ESG initiatives one of few research projects today worth shutting down.
Cynthia Hanawalt is the Director of Climate Finance and Regulation at the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law.
Andy Fitch is the Climate Finance and Regulation Fellow at the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School.
Great Job Cynthia Hanawalt and Andy Fitch & the Team @ Climate Law Blog Source link for sharing this story.
