Stevenson, now 75, describes himself as “a lifelong conservationist.”
In the driveway of his Lewes, Delaware, home sits the hybrid vehicle he often drives to a nearby beach. Solar panels glint atop the roof, which Stevenson custom-designed in 2013 to be at the “optimum angle” to soak up the sun. A framed newspaper article about one of his cross-country bike rides hangs on the wall of his home office, nestled alongside photos of his seven children and 19 grandchildren.
His career has intersected with clean energy — and even wind — at various points.
While working for DuPont in the 1980s, Stevenson helped the chemical giant develop the long-lasting coatings used to make first-generation solar panels and wind turbine blades. In 1999, after leaving the company, he started his own construction business and acquired certifications in energy efficiency and home weatherization. He said he eventually co-founded the Delaware Green Building Council to promote this kind of work.
But despite Stevenson’s environmentally minded career and interests, he’s built a reputation as someone dedicated to preventing, rather than enabling, renewable energy.
After selling his construction business to one of his sons, Stevenson became interested in shaping state policies. A self-described libertarian, he found a home around 2010 at the Caesar Rodney Institute, a Delaware affiliate of the State Policy Network, which the Brown University researchers call “the nation’s most prominent network of conservative state-level think tanks.”
According to the D.C.-based research firm Energy Policy Institute, CRI is among a half dozen “front groups” backed by fossil-fuel interests that regularly attack renewable energy in their local regions.
For a few years, Stevenson worked on a variety of issues at CRI, from data centers and solid-state fuel cells to pipeline infrastructure and Delaware’s carbon-emissions fee. His initial brush with offshore wind came in 2010, when he sent a measured letter to the Obama administration regarding Bluewater Wind, the first proposed wind farm off the coast of Delaware. He voiced opposition to wind tax credits but acknowledged “one of the benefits of windmills” is how quickly they can be built.
It wasn’t until 2017 that he focused deeply on offshore wind, and by then his stance on the energy source was more firmly negative.
Plans for Skipjack Wind Farm — a 966-megawatt Danish-led project slated for waters off Maryland’s coastline with onshore stations in Delaware — were advancing quickly. They took Stevenson by surprise. “My initial response was just the high cost,” he recalled, though he also worried about the turbines ruining the “pristine view.”
The project was led by Ørsted, the world’s largest developer of offshore wind, which had bought the lease from the developers of Bluewater Wind. Stevenson said he tried to enlist help to fight the company, turning to Washington connections he’d forged during his time serving on Trump’s first transition team for the Environmental Protection Agency.
“I knew a lot of people; we had a lot of conversations,” Stevenson recalled. “They told me that I was nuts for taking on offshore wind.”
At the time, Trump officials were actively backing the sector. Former Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke described himself as “very bullish on offshore wind” and executed key lease auctions put forth by the Obama administration — first near North Carolina, then near Massachusetts. Anti-wind policies wouldn’t emerge until the latter half of Trump 1.0, when Zinke’s successor, David Bernhardt, began slow-walking federal permits for offshore projects.
Stevenson received little response from his Washington connections. Undeterred, he simply led an anti-wind campaign on his own.
He attended town hall meetings and submitted public comments. He and fellow residents of local coastal communities organized against the wind project under the name Save Our Beach View, mailing over 35,000 letters and posting constantly to Facebook.
The messages contained several misleading statements. Independent journalist Michael Thomas reported that the letters, for example, “falsely claimed that the project could cause coastal residents’ property values to drop by between 20% and 30%; power costs could rise by 400%; key industries like tourism could see their revenues fall by 50%.”
Nevertheless, Stevenson’s efforts delayed the permitting process for an onshore substation, which in turn delayed wind turbine construction off the Delmarva coast from a planned 2022 start date to 2026 at the earliest. In January of this year, days after Trump took office for his second term, Ørsted moved to refinance the project, likely kicking it even further down the road.
Ultimately, Stevenson said, he “won the battle.”
In 2019, emboldened by his win against Skipjack Wind, Stevenson started searching on social media platforms and in news articles for the names of other residents across the Northeast who were resisting offshore wind farms. He reached out to some of them by phone — “just cold-called them,” he said with a laugh.
He found that there were plenty of individuals, as well as some small groups, protesting with little experience. For example, a handful of activists known as Protect Our Coast NJ didn’t know how to establish themselves as a nonprofit entity. Stevenson said he helped them do it.
Stevenson also started to organize monthly calls among activists from different states. His reach slowly grew from Massachusetts down to North Carolina, with the idea of spreading the tactics he honed in Delaware to other states. What Stevenson would bring them — as the Brown University researchers put it — was “political power.” Filings show that Stevenson’s employer, the Caesar Rodney Institute, also accepted donations from the American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers in both 2019 and 2020.
His network of grassroots activists evolved into the American Coalition for Ocean Protection, which made its public debut in 2021 with a press conference in front of the Massachusetts Statehouse. Four other State Policy Network think tanks had also joined by then.
There, wearing a blue sport coat and flanked by maps of planned wind farms, Stevenson announced that the Caesar Rodney Institute had set up a $75,000 legal fund to support residents along the east coast who wanted to sue to halt offshore wind development. He publicly set a goal of raising $500,000 for the campaign.
Stevenson would later admit that while the coalition’s fundraising “did pretty well,” it never reached anywhere close to his financial goal. No matter. It was the coalition’s relentless messaging and coordination, not so much the money, that would become its greatest weapon.
Great Job Clare Fieseler & the Team @ Canary Media Source link for sharing this story.
