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Don’t Buy the Nostalgia Trump Is Selling

Horrible news from Boulder, Colorado, yesterday, where a man wielding a makeshift flamethrower attacked people marching in solidarity with the Israeli hostages still being held by Hamas. The FBI is investigating it as an act of terror. Politico reports:

About 1:26 p.m., police received calls that a man with a weapon near the county courthouse on 13th and Pearl streets was setting people on fire, according to Boulder Police Chief Steve Redfearn. They found multiple victims with a range of injuries from serious to minor including “injuries consistent with burns,” Redfearn said at a Sunday afternoon news conference. . . .

Eyewitness videos of the attack show a shirtless man holding what appear to be two Molotov cocktails and yelling “Free Palestine!” at a group of demonstrators seeking the release of Israeli hostages being held in Gaza. Witness interviews reported by the Boulder Daily Camera called the attack “absolutely horrific and shocking” and also described Molotov cocktails on the scene. Israeli flags were seen on the ground.

The attack comes less than two weeks after two Israeli embassy staffers were killed by another shooter at an event in Washington, D.C. Our thoughts and prayers are with the victims and their families. Antisemitism is a terrible curse. Happy Monday.

(Photo by Dominic Gwinn/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images)

by William Kristol

For people of a certain age, and especially those of a conservative disposition, nostalgia comes naturally.

So when you see that the New York Knicks—despite an impressively scrappy effort—have once again been eliminated from the NBA playoffs, you don’t gnash your teeth or focus on next year. Instead you think back to the last time the Knicks were NBA champions, 52 years ago (!), in 1973.

What a group of players: Willis Reed and Walt Frazier, Dave DeBusschere and Bill Bradley! Earl the Pearl! What a great coach, CCNY’s Red Holzman! And what a march through the playoffs! The upset victory over the hated Boston Celtics in the Eastern Championship Finals, handing the Celtics their first defeat ever in a seventh game at the Boston Garden. And then the 4–1 win in the finals against Wilt Chamberlain’s Lakers.

Of course, even the glories of 1973 pale by comparison to those of 1970, and that year’s championship against the Lakers, with Willis Reed famously hobbling onto the court for the Game 7. What a time for a young basketball fan from New York. “Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, but to be young was very heaven!”

One could go on. But the point is, memories are a powerful thing. Nostalgia is a powerful thing.

In fact, one can be nostalgic for things that happened before one was alive. You read about Churchill and Britain in World War II, you listen to a few BBC reports from the time and to some of Churchill’s speeches, and you feel nostalgia for that era of greatness too, even though you only know it as hearsay and history.

You can also be nostalgic about events from the more recent past, when you were already an adult. Reagan’s 1984 speech to the boys of Pointe du Hoc. The magical McCain campaign of 2000—until it was brought down in the mud of South Carolina.

Nostalgia of this kind is a normal human phenomenon. It is—I think—a healthy phenomenon. And as a political matter, a nostalgic conservatism is a useful check on the errors of presentism and the temptations of progressivism.

But nostalgia has its downside, too. And one can’t help but see that clearly now, in the America of 2025.

For one thing, it leads one to forget the dark sides of the past in ways that can mislead one in the present. Then there is the really dangerous kind of nostalgia: a nostalgia that’s been purposefully weaponized.

Weaponized nostalgia in the hands of a demagogue and his movement goes beyond obtuseness to past evils, beyond curmudgeonly close-mindedness about the present, even beyond an unpleasant intolerance for the unfamiliar. It becomes a rabid hostility to—even a hatred for—whomever it’s easy to blame for producing this new world around us, a world that seems strange and scary. When demagogues exploit this kind of nostalgia, it can become an ugly thing indeed.

As it is in the United States today.

Any healthy polity will have a streak of conservatism. A healthy conservatism can be useful precisely in standing against a “conservative” movement that has embraced nostalgic bitterness and anger. True conservatives can appeal against that movement’s hatreds by citing the old principles of the Declaration and provisions of the Constitution.

But a healthy polity has to have a progressive element as well. It’s progressive types who can most easily explain, for example, how much we’ll damage our future well-being if we slash away at medical research or halt immigration. Dogmatic progressivism is a trap. But an appreciation of progress is not.

The normal political fights in a free country are between conservatives and progressives. At a time when there are urgent threats to what is best in both traditions, those two can come together to defend a broader set of liberal principles that transcend conservatism and progressivism.

If conservatives tend to do this with an overlay of backwards-looking nostalgia, forward-looking progressives can correct them by emphasizing a brighter future ahead.

And so, if I react to the Knicks’ loss by thinking back to the glories of the past, I also value my fellow Knicks loyalists of a more progressive bent who see defeat and enthusiastically reply: “Wait till next year!”

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by Cathy Young

Sunday is likely to be remembered among the most extraordinary days in Russia’s three-plus-year war in Ukraine. It was the day Ukraine carried out a massive drone attack on military airports across Russia, destroying or severely damaging as many as 41 fighter planes—mostly Soviet-era missile-carrying bombers Russia no longer has the capacity to build. If that number is accurate, Russia has lost as much as one-third of its strategic bombing force—and a part of its nuclear triad. (While only 13 hits are confirmed by satellite imagery right now, that data is limited to one of the five bases that were hit.) The strike, apparently planned in a sophisticated intelligence operation over the course of some 18 months, has been rightly described as “stunning,” “incredible” and “fantastic.”

And it raises some questions. Is this attack, carried out on the eve of the next round of the Russia/Ukraine talks in Istanbul, a game-changer? And how does it fit into the bigger picture of the current state of Russia’s war in Ukraine?

Until Sunday, the Russia-Ukraine negotiations had been mostly dormant (and deadly). Russia made unworkable and frankly insulting proposals along the lines of “give us four regions now or we’ll take six later” and generally made it clear that it wanted nothing short of a disarmed and subjugated Ukraine. This “diplomacy” was punctuated, on a regular basis, with horrifying strikes that targeted Ukrainian civilians. Donald Trump made accusatory and vaguely threatening noises in Russia’s direction, lamenting Vladimir Putin’s bafflingly aggressive behavior but always trotting out some excuse to give Russia (and himself) a little more time before imposing new sanctions. Meanwhile, Russian and Ukrainian forces remained locked in grueling positional warfare in the battlefields of Ukraine, with Russia making very modest gains at tremendous cost to its own troops.

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The big news, before Sunday’s strike, was the apparent start of Russia’s summer offensive, which Putin evidently hopes will result in big enough gains to justify the Kremlin’s current intransigence. The anti-Ukraine contingent in the West has latched on to the narrative that Ukrainian defenses are deteriorating or even collapsing. It’s a claim that hasn’t actually died after the Ukrainian drone attack on Russian military airfields; instead that success has been spun as a sign of “weakness” by Ukraine, or desperation. But even Russia’s war-hawk “milbloggers” know better, as a roundup of their frenzied reactions shows.

What’s really happening on the ground in Ukraine? Certainly nothing close to “collapse,” as University of St. Andrew (Edinburgh) strategic studies professor Phillips O’Brien convincingly argues in his newsletter. He writes that there is an “uptick in offensive operations”—most notably, an incursion into the Sumy province, which Russia apparently intends to try to turn into a “buffer zone” and where it has recently deployed 50,000 soldiers in addition to some 75,000 who were already in the region. Yet despite this massive military presence, Russian troops have been unable to push deeper than three miles into Ukrainian territory, gaining barely over half a mile in the past week because of Ukrainian defenses. Likewise, while the Ukrainian Armed Forces are having some real problems in parts of the Donetsk region, particularly in the Liman/Pokrovsk sector of the frontlines, they have continued to counterattack, sometimes regaining lost ground.

Against this backdrop, the daring drone strike on Russian military airfields is a masterstroke: a morale booster for Ukrainians and a reminder to the Kremlin that there are no safe spaces on Russian territory anymore. Will Trump also get the message that his favorite strongman isn’t that strong and that Volodymyr Zelensky actually does have some cards? Maybe not. But between Ukraine and Trump, it certainly isn’t Ukraine that looks like a loser right now.

by Andrew Egger

Yesterday, Illinois Democratic Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi told CBS’s Face the Nation that the White House’s revocation of Chinese students’ visas would be met with “cheering” by the Chinese Communist Party.

“They want the scientists and the entrepreneurs and the engineers who can come and help their economy,” the congressman said. “And so we are probably helping them, as well as other countries, more than helping ourselves with this policy.”

When I read Krishnamoorthi’s comments, I thought about VIPKid.

VIPKid is a Chinese online tutoring company, originally founded to connect Chinese children with English tutors in the West. In the years after its founding in 2014, the company became a major success, paying tens of thousands of mostly U.S. and Canadian teachers hourly rates to hold one-on-one lessons with hundreds of thousands of mostly Chinese students.

In 2021, however, China banned VIPKid and other services connecting Chinese kids with Western English teachers. The change was billed as part of a broader effort, known as “double reduction,” to ease educational pressures on overworked Chinese students. But many argued that China—which also banned foreign textbooks and made “Xi Jinping Thought” a subject of mandatory school instruction the same year—was quietly trying to limit Western influences on their youth.

“There is another aim, which is to lock out Western culture,” writer and Chinese expat Guo Baosheng told Radio Free Asia at the time. “It’s all in the service of political stability for the regime.”

Just four years ago, “double reduction” seemed part of a familiar story: an autocratic regime shrinking suspiciously away from contact with the outside world, crimping its own people’s freedom in the process. Now, four years later, further U.S.-China educational decoupling is coming from our side. America’s policymakers have lost their confidence in our system and in openness in general. They no longer believe that growing contact between free and repressed peoples will lead to a growing desire for freedom everywhere. Today, it isn’t China indulging the impulse to limit its peoples’ and institutions’ freedom to serve an ideological agenda, it’s us.

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AMERICA IS BEING RESPECTED AGAIN: In other “America’s idiocy is China’s gain” news, Axios reports this morning on a new global-favorability poll showing America’s reputation sagging and China’s surging.

The Morning Consult poll, which surveyed residents of 13 major nations outside the United States and Canada, found a net favorability of 8.8 points for China and -1.5 points for America. Back in January 2024, the same poll found the United States with a favorability rating above 20 points abroad and China’s popularity underwater.

“Since January 2025, the overwhelming majority of countries simultaneously exhibit worsening views of the United States and improving views of China,” writes Morning Consult’s Jason McMann, per Axios. “Only in Russia have views of America meaningfully improved.”

GOING TO A DARK PLACE: If you didn’t believe things were getting out of hand, here are a few immigration-enforcement snapshots from this weekend.

  • Politico reports that Homeland Security officers “briefly detained” a staffer for Rep. Jerry Nadler (D-N.Y.), entering his New York office to place her in handcuffs. Video of the incident shows a DHS officer saying Nadler’s staff was “harboring rioters” in their office. The staffer, heard crying on the video, was ultimately not arrested or charged with a crime. In a statement, Nadler slammed DHS and President Trump for its “aggressive and heavy-handed tactics.” “The decision to enter a congressional office and detain a staff member,” he added, “demonstrates a deeply troubling disregard for proper legal boundaries.”

  • MySanAntonio reports that “at least three migrant children were taken into custody and restrained with zip ties” at the Texas city’s immigration court last week. “The children—two boys and a girl who appeared to be between the ages of 9 and 12 years old—were detained and zip-tied, along with adults who appeared to be relatives, after an immigration judge had dismissed their case, according to Carolina Rivera, an immigration attorney who serves as a federal advocate and liaison for [the Catholic Legal Immigration Network].”

  • And Boston’s ABC News affiliate WCVB reports the arrest last week of Marcelo Gomes, an 18-year-old high school student who was brought to the United States illegally at the age of 5. Gomes, an honors student with no criminal history, was detained while driving to a volleyball practice. “He told me he had chains around his ankles, he had chains around his wrists,” Gomes’s girlfriend told the station. “He’s in a cell with 30 other men. He’s the only 18-year-old there, he’s the youngest there. He is not a criminal. He’s a member of this community and has never done anything wrong.”

All these stories come amid a broader administration push for federal law enforcement to dramatically accelerate immigration arrests. Back in January, the Washington Post reported that ICE had been instructed to ramp up daily arrests to at least “1,200 to 1,500.” Last week, White House deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller told Fox News that the new goal was at least 3,000 arrested migrants per day. He communicated the same number to ICE brass in a tense meeting last week, according to Axios: “Miller’s directive and tone had people leaving the meeting feeling their jobs could be in jeopardy if the new targets aren’t reached.”

Ordering law enforcement to hit arrest quotas: What could go wrong?

BIDEN CLONES: Shouldn’t somebody be monitoring Grandpa’s internet usage? In a Truth Social post yesterday, Trump shared a wild message from a supporter: “There is no #JoeBiden – executed in 2020. #Biden clones doubles & robotic engineered soulless mindless entities are what you see. >#Democrats don’t know the difference.”

Wow, you don’t say! On the one hand, this post is such howling unfiltered internet-conspiracy nonsense that it’s hard to imagine even Trump going further with it than a Truth Social repost. On the other hand, this sort of thing is breaking e-containment more and more recently. We’re in a world where the secretary of health and human services believes in chemtrails.

Whether it’s a momentary blip or something that’s going to harden into a Trump obsession, “There is no Joe Biden” is an unsettling reminder of the lunatic fever swamp in which the president routinely marinates his brain. Enjoy going about your day with the knowledge that, at any given moment, the president may be scrolling away on his phone, actively making himself more conspiratorial and paranoid.

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French Leaders Are Using Trump’s Trade War to Push Austerity

Right from his inauguration, Donald Trump unleashed slash-and-burn austerity on the federal government — with even deeper cuts planned for coming months. As part of a breakneck eighteen-month agenda to maximize “governmental efficiency and productivity,” Trump has advanced a wide-ranging attack on the way the US government has hitherto functioned, including internationally.

In early April, Trump carried through on another campaign promise to upend global commerce by imposing massive tariffs on nearly every other country. Stock markets plunged, and business confidence evaporated. For a moment, it seemed like the postwar system of global commerce hung in the balance.

Trump’s smash-and-grab announcements sent governments around the world scrambling, faced with rising fears of Washington provoking a global recession.

In response to the initial “Liberation Day” tariff announcements, French premier François Bayrou told Le Parisien that Trump’s moves could trigger a global catastrophe. He warned that large numbers of jobs would be threatened, all of society would suffer, and that the human costs would be “considerable.”

But Bayrou also made sure that the crisis didn’t go to waste. He had already been facing a fierce upcoming budget battle in a bitterly divided National Assembly and quickly used the confrontation to get ahead of the debate. Bayrou warned that looming instability would also mean reduced investment in French industry. “Trump’s policy could cost us 0.5 percent of GDP,” he told the newspaper. France’s government has already revised down its GDP growth expectations for 2026, from 1.4 percent in October to 1.2 percent now.

At the height of the tariff fears, Trump pulled back, announcing a flat 10 percent tariff on every country except China for ninety days. The new battle plan was a trade war against Beijing — cranking up tariffs from 34 to 145 percent after China retaliated with its own new tariffs on the United States. The stock market rallied on the news that the massive global rates were out.

Since then, Trump has seesawed between threatening then rescinding promises to slap levies on countries all over the world. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced at a JPMorgan-hosted investment conference that trade negotiations between the United States and China wouldn’t drag on, reported the Financial Times. Bessent called the trade war between the two countries “unsustainable.”

Still, beyond the crackpot logic of perfectly balanced trade deficits, or plausible theories of market manipulation and insider trading, Trump’s trade war also suits other goals for ruling elites around the world. Even as they issue fiery rebukes and sensible-sounding condemnations, they are using this moment to push their existing agendas. For his part, Bayrou argues that the threat of a trade war makes addressing France’s budget deficit, which has ballooned during Emmanuel Macron’s eight years as president, even more urgent.

“If we don’t do anything, our debt burden will become far and away our biggest expense,” Bayrou warned. The French government’s goal, Bayrou says, is to get the budget deficit down from 5.4 percent to 3 percent by 2029.

“But this crisis could change everything,” he added, saying that France needs to make progress on how much it produces, how many hours it works, and how many jobs it creates.

At a press conference in mid-April, Bayrou laid out his government’s plan to cut €40 billion from the next budget to wrestle the deficit down. To accomplish this, he hasn’t ruled out lifting the limit on France’s thirty-five-hour workweek or even raising the retirement age. “Our duty is to look reality in the face,” he told Le Parisien.

With Trump’s trade war threats against Europe uncertain, Bayrou is still charging full speed ahead.

To meet its deficit target, also in line with nominal European limits, the French government’s goal is to slash 6 percent of public spending — worth €110 billion annually — between 2026 and 2029. And while Bayrou called France’s debt burden “a dangerous trap” that “threatens the country’s independence,” he’s also ruled out raising taxes to address the deficit, calling that solution “unsustainable.”

Instead, the government is looking for savings in all the familiar places — like France’s health care system. Bayrou is even putting paid sick days in the crosshair.

“It’s important to take into account that we spend more on sick days than on pensions,” Bayrou’s minister of social affairs, Catherine Vautrin, said recently, pointing to the €22 billion deficit forecast for social security spending in 2026.

Bayrou’s minister of public accounts, Amélie de Montchalin, pointed to the fact that France spent €17 billion covering sick days in 2024, a quarter more than it had in 2021.

According to de Montchalin, covering sick days so readily has created a situation where people think they’re entitled to “free access” to coverage — encouraging a lack of “personal responsibility.”

Last month, the government also flirted with new taxes on pensioners. Marc Ferracci, Bayrou’s minister of industry and energy, boosted a plan backed by Patrick Martin, the president of France’s equivalent to the Chamber of Commerce. Getting rid of a 10 percent tax deduction that pensioners can currently claim on up to €4,321 a month could generate €4-5 billion a year, Ferracci explained. Jean-Hervé Lorenzi, a liberal economist who’s a member of the board of the Edmond de Rothschild banking group in France, had a narrower proposal. For him, getting rid of the deduction for “wealthy” pensioners — defined in sweeping terms as those who get a net monthly payment of €3,000 or own their own homes — could raise €2.5 billion a year.

For now, those plans are on the back burner. Laurent Wauquiez, the head of the conservative Les Républicains, boasted in mid-May that he’d made de Montchalin back down by threatening to pull his party’s support from the government if they raised any taxes at all. His plans for cutting costs come from another direction: he wants to cut two-thirds of all the government’s agencies. He is now labeling himself a “French Milei,” akin to Argentina’s budget-slashing president, Javier Milei.

France has enjoyed robust public services and welfare measures ever since the social compromise negotiated between French labor and the ruling class after World War II. France has a rich — albeit romanticized — tradition of social conflict, and it would be difficult for any government to attack the social state, such as Trump has tried to do in the United States, without provoking an open confrontation with French labor. Macron, who has been president since 2017, is well-aware of this. He has pursued a clever strategy which takes account of this reality — but which has also produced the current fiscal crisis.

During the COVID-19 lockdowns, Macron made sure that the state covered the salaries businesses paid to workers in order to avoid mass layoffs. But he’s also raised the retirement age and implemented more restrictive workfare programs. As economy minister from 2014 to 2016, and an important advisor to then president François Hollande, even before taking over the presidency Macron was a lead actor in a series of initiatives liberalizing France’s employment laws.

Despite this, France’s social state still does exist. But Macron’s slow-burn plan to dismantle it is starting to pay off.

Instead of dramatic, sudden cuts to spending, Macron has cut taxes. Significantly, he’s stripped local authorities of taxation powers, which used to include a tax on building housing and a tax on businesses. At the level of local départements, annual tax receipts are down €8 billion since 2022.

Falling tax revenues and increased spending obligations for benefits pegged to inflation has an inevitable outcome: at every level of government, funding is running out.

A recent 1.7 percent inflation-pegged boost for the RSA — a welfare payment for the poorest — was a bridge too far for département-level governments, which finance this benefit. On April 16, the conservative president of the body representing these local authorities announced that “the constant increase of social spending” is imperiling local governments’ capacity to “fulfill their essential missions.”

As a result, the commission said, local governments are being forced to make choices between investing in roads or social housing, cultural support or tourism and sports, which is damaging to regional planning efforts.

There are three main places tax money goes in France: funding social security, the state budget, and the local authorities. Thanks to tax cuts in recent years, a key source of funding for social security has been revenue from sales tax, known as value-added tax (VAT), which every French person pays. Sales tax revenue has also been plugging some funding gaps for local governments as their receipts have fallen.

Further budget pressures from both sides, including the elimination of a tax on fortunes and increasing debt obligations, has made sales tax revenue crucial to funding the state’s budget. But local, département-level, and regional budgets need the money now, too. Five years ago, 90 percent of sales tax revenue went to the state. Now just half of it does.

A shock like Trump’s trade war is the perfect opportunity for everything to come to a head, with the new, added threat of declining growth. Crushed between increased spending and falling revenue, and with no political consensus for raising taxes, the obvious result is the same option that Bayrou’s government is going for: spending cuts.

At the same time, Trump’s overblown threat to withdraw Washington from its trans-Atlantic role is a perfect opportunity for France to take on a leading role in a new European military order. At the same time as Bayrou talks about referendums to reign in government spending, he’s also promising €3 billion in additional military spending in the next budget. And as Bayrou’s ministers check temperatures in their search for fake sick days, France’s defense minister, Sébastien Lecornu, quietly unfroze €1.3 billion worth of defense spending credits, ostensibly earmarked for a rainy day.

Even with the bevy of cuts coming down the pipeline, the government’s independent High Council of Public Finances has warned that the deficit reduction trajectory they’ve laid out isn’t credible.

Last year, the government anticipated a 4.4 percent deficit. The actual number ended up being 5.8 percent. The new goal for 2025 is 5.4 percent, and then 4.6 percent in 2026, 4.1 percent in 2027, and 3.4 percent in 2028.

But even keeping the deficit down to 5.4 percent of GDP this year is far off, the council said on April 16. Getting there would “require strict control of discretionary and social spending.” Given the current fiscal situation, they warned that any margin for error in the case of a “new shock” appears to be “very limited.”

But maybe Washington’s behavior is nothing to fear. Back in March, Jordan Bardella, the president of Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National party and a potential 2027 presidential candidate, called for creating a French ministry inspired by Elon Musk’s Department of Governmental Efficiency.

France has lived “beyond its means” for the past fifty years, Bardella said. “It’s time for a big clean up.” For some at least, the Trump administration is an example for France, and not just a threat.

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Whataboutism Is Rotting Our Brains, Our Consciences, and Our Politics

(Photo by Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post via Getty Images)

BEFORE WE CAN ADEQUATELY RESPOND to the frontal assault Donald Trump has launched on our way of life, we need to grapple with whataboutism. It is destroying our capacity to make rational judgments. In the face of an unprecedented defiance of law, tradition, and the Constitution, too many of us find ourselves so mired in polarized thinking that we can’t see straight.

Humans have always been beguiled by black-and-white thinking. Something is either good or bad. You are either with us or against us. Greek or barbarian. Saved or damned. Sigmund Freud coined the term “Madonna/whore complex” to describe the mindset of men who relegate women into one of two categories: pure or sullied. A related error in logic is called “tu quoque” (you too), a form of the ad hominem fallacy because it attacks the person rather than disproving their argument—which should sound familiar to anyone who’s lived through the past few years of American politics.

The tendency to engage in polarized thinking is hardly new, and yet, it seems that we’ve regressed in recent years. We live in an age of overflowing information and knowledge, and yet we seem more inclined now than in the recent past to succumb to whataboutism.

It’s perfectly clear why Trump and his many enablers rely on whataboutism. It’s the easiest deflection. What is the proper response to Trump’s iniquitous treatment of women? What about Bill Clinton? How can one evaluate his pardons of the January 6th insurrectionists? What about all those who rioted in protest of George Floyd’s murder and were never prosecuted? (They were.) Was Trump’s refusal to return highly classified documents a serious breach? What about Joe Biden keeping files in his garage? (Biden returned them when asked.) Is Trump corrupting the rule of law with his pardons of friends, donors, and political allies? What about Joe Biden’s pardons of Hunter and his entire family?

This game can be played endlessly, and it has been played aggressively for the past decade. It’s important to dwell on the consequences. Some people who are caught in a lie, betrayal, or other transgression admit their guilt and seek to repair the damage. That’s how mature people and societies stay civilized.

Truly depraved people don’t take that route. Trump uses whataboutism not just to change the subject or disarm the accuser (“tu quoque” was pretty much the theme of the 2016 presidential race) but also to breed cynicism. If “everybody does it” then it’s unfair to hold him accountable. And because people who constantly transgress can’t function with the knowledge that they are immoral, they must believe—and teach—that everyone is just as corrupt as they are; that the standards themselves are flawed or at least universally flouted. Does a mafia don tell his daughter that he’s a criminal, or does he explain that the world is composed of killers and losers and that you must choose one or the other?

Though Americans are sometimes perceived as idealistic, there are other strains in our character that demagogues can tap into, such as cynicism about politics. A line perhaps inaccurately attributed to Mark Twain has been a staple of after-dinner speeches for more than 150 years: “America has no native criminal class, except Congress.” Or as a more modern wag put it: “Politics comes from the Greek ‘poly’ (many) and ‘ticks’ (small, annoying bloodsuckers).”

A certain amount of skepticism about politicians is healthy. But cynicism is corrosive because it invites the very thing it scorns. Once you elect a sociopath and agree with his jaundiced view that everyone is corrupt, you’ve lost any chance of upholding basic values. If you treasure honesty, integrity, the rule of law, and decency, you must be prepared to reject whataboutism and to risk mockery by insisting that no, not everybody does it, and we don’t want to accept the kind of society in which that is assumed.

As David Frum outlined in the Atlantic:

Nothing like this has been attempted or even imagined in the history of the American presidency. Throw away the history books; discard feeble comparisons to scandals of the past. There is no analogy with any previous action by any past president. The brazenness of the self-enrichment resembles nothing seen in any earlier White House. This is American corruption on the scale of a post-Soviet republic or a postcolonial African dictatorship.

Trump’s corruption is so off the charts (a Qatari luxury jet, hundreds of millions in memecoins and tokens, bidding wars to dine with him as his club) that it defies comparison. Through the memecoin, anyone anywhere for any reason can put hundreds, or thousands, or millions of dollars directly into Trump’s pocket. Not into a campaign fund, not into a political party, but into the hands of the president. And as we witnessed on his Middle East trip, eager foreign leaders and businessmen are lining up to do so. Vietnam, hoping for relief from tariffs, is in talks to help Trump build a luxury golf course. Due almost entirely to his crypto holdings, Trump has, by one estimate, doubled his net worth in just four months.

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The Constitution could not be clearer. Article I, Section 9 reads: “No title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign state.”

Are we so cynical that we cannot summon outrage at a flagrant disregard for our founding document?

In keeping with the current grab-everything-that-isn’t-nailed-down ethos, the Trump administration announced last month that it was disbanding the Justice Department unit devoted to ferreting out crypto crime, and the Securities and Exchange Commission dropped an investigation into one of Trump’s largest donors—the one who donated top dollar (or memecoin) to have dinner with Trump at his country club outside D.C.

Yes, Biden’s pardons of his family were grubby, but they were a few pebbles compared with Trump’s avalanche of corruption. The current president is signaling with his pardons that anti-democratic violence is encouraged if undertaken on his behalf, and that no action, not even murder, is beyond redemption if you are in his camp. He has pardoned a corrupt thief who happened to be the son of a big donor, granted a “FULL AND Unconditional Pardon” to a Virginia sheriff who was convicted of selling government offices but who was redeemed by his Trump loyalty. The family of Ashli Babbitt, who violently stormed the Capitol and was shot by police, received a generous payout from the Trump-controlled government. Murderers, politicos on the take, swindlers, thieving reality TV stars, gangsters—all have been pardoned by Trump in the past few weeks. If you’re a Trump supporter, you have an honest-to-goodness get-out-of-jail-free card. The Department of Justice’s watchword is no longer “Equal Justice Under Law,” but, in the words of Ed Martin, Trump’s newly minted pardon advisor, “No MAGA left behind.”

We must disenthrall ourselves from the whataboutism mindset. There are honorable politicians. There are honest businessmen. There are police and soldiers and teachers and programmers and athletes and judges of integrity. Millions of Americans are appalled and deeply embarrassed by the kakistocracy we’ve elevated. Hold on to that outrage. It’s the road back from this disaster.

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Hamas Discussing U.S. Cease-Fire Plan With Other Palestinian Factions

Welcome back to World Brief, where we’re looking at negotiations for an Israel-Hamas cease-fire, China’s low-level attendance at the Shangri-La Dialogue, and Ukraine accusing Russia of stalling peace talks.


Truce Proposal

Hamas said on Friday that it was still reviewing a U.S. proposal for a 60-day cease-fire with Israel—which Israel agreed to the day before—and added that it is consulting with other Palestinian factions.

Welcome back to World Brief, where we’re looking at negotiations for an Israel-Hamas cease-fire, China’s low-level attendance at the Shangri-La Dialogue, and Ukraine accusing Russia of stalling peace talks.


Truce Proposal

Hamas said on Friday that it was still reviewing a U.S. proposal for a 60-day cease-fire with Israel—which Israel agreed to the day before—and added that it is consulting with other Palestinian factions.

Hamas initially said on Thursday that the proposal “fails to meet any of the just and legitimate demands of our people” and shows that Israel “fundamentally seeks to entrench the occupation and perpetuate policies of killing and starvation, even during what is supposed to be a period of temporary de-escalation.” However, the group did not outright reject the deal at that time and said its officials were “undertaking a thorough and responsible review” of it.

Although the details of the plan, put forward by U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff with help from Egypt and Qatar, have not been made public, reports indicate that the cease-fire would last 60 days; Hamas would release 28 Israeli hostages (10 living and 18 deceased) during the first week in exchange for 1,236 Palestinian prisoners and the remains of 180 Palestinians. There are 58 hostages remaining in Gaza, 20 of whom are believed to be alive.

As soon as the truce went into effect, Israel would cease all military operations in Gaza and begin to allow more humanitarian aid into the territory. This assistance would be delivered via the United Nations, the Red Crescent, and other agreed-upon channels.

If further negotiations to secure a permanent cease-fire did not conclude within the 60 days, then the deal could be extended. Once a permanent truce is agreed on, Hamas would then be required to release the remaining 30 hostages.

However, according to Hamas, the U.S. proposal does not guarantee aid deliveries into Gaza, does not commit to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territory, and does not include language about what would happen after the initial 60 days expires. This is “far from what Hamas agreed to with the American mediator,” Hamas spokesperson Sami Abu Zuhri told Houthi-owned Yemeni media outlet al-Masirah.

Recent cease-fire efforts have stalled as both sides refuse to concede major sticking points in the war. Namely, these include Israel demanding that Hamas disarm completely, be dismantled as a governing force, and return all 58 hostages before the war ends. Meanwhile, Hamas refuses to give up its weapons and has argued that Israel must first pull its troops from Gaza and commit to ending the conflict.

At the same time, Gaza’s humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. On Friday, Israeli airstrikes killed 27 people, according to hospital officials. The United Nations’ humanitarian affairs agency also accused Israel of blocking all but a trickle of aid from entering Gaza, creating “the hungriest place on Earth” at a time when a controversial new aid distribution system—also backed by Washington—has wreaked havoc on southern Gaza.


Today’s Most Read


What We’re Following

Shangri-La attendance. The Shangri-La Dialogue kicked off in Singapore on Friday with one notable absence: Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun. Although Beijing has previously sent its top defense diplomat to the security conference, Dong sent a lower-level delegation in his place this year to discuss the country’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific.

This comes in stark contrast to the United States, which sent Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to give what experts expect will be the Pentagon’s most comprehensive public outline of U.S. defense priorities in the region since President Donald Trump began his second term in January.

But while many defense officials at Shangri-La are prioritizing tackling U.S.-China tensions and rising Indo-Pacific threats, European leaders warned the international community not to lose sight on efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war.

“If you consider that Russia could be allowed to take a part of the territory of Ukraine without any restriction, without any constraint, without any reaction of the global order, how would you phrase what would happen in Taiwan?” French President Emmanuel Macron asked, adding, “What would you do the day something happened in” the Philippines?

Unknown peace terms. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha accused Russia on Friday of purposefully stalling peace negotiations by failing to share a promised memorandum outlining Moscow’s terms.

Both sides agreed to provide that information following a round of direct talks in Istanbul earlier this month, and Kyiv claims to have already submitted its terms to both Russia and the United States. But Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on Friday that Moscow’s memorandum could not “be made public” and would instead be submitted during the next round of dialogue in Istanbul, scheduled for Monday. Both sides have agreed to attend the meeting in theory, but Sybiha has warned that Kyiv may only show up if Russia’s terms are provided beforehand.

“We are interested in seeing these meetings continue because we want the war to end this year,” Sybiha said, adding that Moscow “must accept an unconditional cease-fire” to allow broader negotiations to take place. Russia, however, appears to remain largely uninterested in an immediate truce, instead focusing on the so-called “root causes” of the war, such as Kyiv’s NATO ambitions.

New mediation body. Representatives from more than 30 countries convened in Hong Kong on Friday to establish a global mediation-based dispute resolution group. Called the Convention on the Establishment of the International Organization for Mediation, the body aims to provide “Chinese wisdom” to resolve conflicts between nations and “move beyond the zero-sum mindset of ‘you lose, and I win,’” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said.

Beijing maintains that this is the first intergovernmental legal organization to focus on mediation and that it will be vital to help safeguard the principles of the U.N. Charter. But some experts worry that it could also further China’s global south ambitions. Beijing has long aimed to be a leader among developing nations, and with Trump’s trade war isolating Washington from the rest of the world, China is hoping to bolster its arbitration credentials and establish a reputation on par with the International Court of Justice.


Odds and Ends

Archaeologists in Guatemala have newly discovered a vast complex of pyramids, sanctuaries, and even a canal system belonging to the ancient Mayan people, Guatemala’s Culture Ministry announced on Thursday. Stretching across three areas near the sacred Mayan site of Uaxactún, the ruins are believed to be nearly 3,000 years old. “These sites form a previously unknown urban triangle whose existence we were unaware of until now,” the ministry said. “These new archeological discoveries constitute a testament of Mayan culture’s greatness, which today we are making known to the whole world.”

#Hamas #Discussing #U.S #CeaseFire #Plan #Palestinian #Factions

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Dems Weigh High-Risk, High-Reward Plan to Win the Senate

A ‘Blue Dot’ sign is viewed along the entrance to a farmhouse on October 24, 2024 near Omaha, Nebraska. Nebraska Democrats were hopeful that Omaha-area voters would choose Democratic candidates during the 2024 election and make Omaha a ‘blue dot’ in a field of Republican red on the Electoral College vote map. (Photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images)

DEMOCRATIC STRATEGISTS IN RECENT MONTHS approached officials at the party’s main Senate super PAC to discuss a bank-shot idea for flipping control of the Senate: quietly backing independent candidates in traditionally Republican states.

The strategy is highly sensitive. Any public acknowledgement that the Democratic political infrastructure is, in fact, backing non-Democrats risks angering the party’s base and ruining the aura of independence of the candidates the party is surreptitiously trying to help. Any involvement, should it come, would likely be done late in the cycle and with minimum disclosure.

Still, operatives have pinpointed states where they think the approach might work, according to two people familiar with the conversations. The list includes Nebraska, Iowa, and Alaska, all of which are hosting Senate contests this year in what could end up being Democrats’ best chance at denying Republicans another majority.

The discussions happening between Senate Majority PAC and other party leaders underscore just how difficult the Senate map is for Democrats this cycle. And it is another indication that top officials recognize their brand is badly damaged among a wide swath of the country.

However, some of these Democratic officials thinking about next year’s midterms have reached another, more dire conclusion.

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The GOP’s Healthcare Flimflammery Is The New Big Lie

Sam Stein and Jonathan Cohn discuss the truth behind GOP Medicaid messaging, the real impact of the proposed cuts, and why this isn’t about fraud but about gutting coverage.

Check out Jonathan’s piece here

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Joni Ernst’s “Apology” Video Is Deeply Unsettling

Tim Miller and Sam Stein break down a jaw-dropping series of statements from Senator Joni Ernst — including one from a cemetery, where she basically tells Iowans worried about Medicaid cuts to embrace death… and Jesus.

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Bulwark on Sunday: RFK Jr.’s War on Science

This week on Bulwark on Sunday, Jonathan Cohn joins Bill Kristol to discuss RFK Jr. ‘s gutting of pandemic readiness, the misleading guidance on boosters, and why some doctors are furious.

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A Half-Century of Harry Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital

It is hard not to romanticize Harry Braverman. A Depression-era metalworker and committed socialist who in 1974, two years before his untimely death, published what remains one of the most powerful applications of Karl Marx’s theory of capital to American history — isn’t this the archetype of Antonio Gramsci’s organic intellectual, the worker raised to consciousness through study and struggle?

To understand how capitalism works requires journeying into “the hidden abode of production,” Marx wrote, the place where human labor power is consumed. Labor and Monopoly Capital took this idea seriously. Across twenty meticulous chapters, Braverman explored the process by which capitalists siphoned value out of their workers. This extraction splintered the human being. Body was torn from mind; motions became mechanical; knowledge was locked away in business suites. Here was “the degradation of work in the twentieth century,” as Braverman’s subtitle had it. But alongside degradation ran a second process. As workers were automated out of industrial production, capital furrowed its way into other realms of life. Factories gave way to offices, the coppersmith to the clerk, and then to sprawling postindustrial economies of services and care. The genius of Labor and Monopoly Capital was to narrate these two developments together. Capital reconstituted itself over and over in an endless cycle. But in so doing it created new worlds of labor, a molten working class.

Half a century after its publication, Labor and Monopoly Capital remains a classic. It has sold over one hundred thousand copies and continues to inform studies of capital, labor, and class. But it has also been subject to partial or plainly incorrect assessments. Many have reduced Braverman to the “deskilling thesis” — the idea that capitalism linearly forces workers to perform ever-simpler and more menial labor — when in fact he insisted that this was too simple a claim. Others have accused him of a wistful nostalgia for artisanal labor, when in fact Braverman countered that objection in his introduction (although this is a point to which we will return). Worst of all, despite its impressive reach in radical circles, Labor and Monopoly Capital has been ignored by mainstream historians of capitalism and dismissed by many sociologists of labor. (With some important exceptions: for instance, the labor historian David Montgomery and many of his students.) The feeling was mutual, though. Never a professor, Braverman acerbically critiqued his academic counterparts.

Braverman’s text remains remarkably useful to think with. Some of its assumptions feel dated, of course. There is no mention of globalization, and Braverman did not anticipate the full force of neoliberalism — two processes that, although already underway in 1974, had yet to cohere into objects of analysis. And yet much of the book feels ahead of its time. Labor and Monopoly Capital was prescient in its emphasis on services and care work as capital’s future objects. It correctly anticipated that the mid-century boom in productivity was singular and unrecoverable. It identified a confluence of management and technology that has evolved into ever more oppressive forms under platform capitalism. On each of these fronts, Braverman’s arguments forecast the present  historical conjuncture. They can help see us through it too.

We want to emphasize three aspects of Labor and Monopoly Capital that feel particularly relevant today. The first is Braverman’s fidelity to Marx — especially the latter’s understanding of capital as an unending process of valorization that nonetheless creates a potential emancipatory future. The second is Braverman’s treatment of the service economy, which is too often subordinated to his analysis of Taylorism and industrial production. For Braverman, the rise of services was not a mere repetition of capital accumulation in a new realm. It threatened the emancipatory opening of the future that he took from Marx. In other words, this second aspect of the book puts pressure on the first. The result is an ambivalent approach to nostalgia and temporality in Braverman’s anti-capitalism — the third aspect — that speaks to our own moment just as much, if not more, as it did to his.

Braverman came young to Marxism. Born in 1920 to a working-class family in Brooklyn, as a teenager he joined the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP), where he remained an active member until mounting internal conflict led to his expulsion in 1953. Founded in 1938, at the height of the political upheavals of the “Age of the CIO,” the SWP was communist but anti-Stalinist; skeptical of big-tent coalitions with liberals; committed to a worker-led revolution. Although Braverman often criticized the party, for fifteen years it was his political home. It gave his radicalism a dissident lilt, invested in revolutionary politics but equally in critique, a rare blend of what Ernst Bloch called the “warm” and “cold” streams of Marxist thought.

From 1937 to 1953, Braverman worked as a manual laborer. He apprenticed as a coppersmith at the Brooklyn Naval Yards and refit asbestos pipes on harbored ships (possibly the cause of his early death). In 1946, he followed his wife, Miriam — also an SWP organizer — to Youngstown, Ohio, where he became a steelworker. Braverman rarely invoked these experiences in his public writing. And yet in a sense he was always reflecting on them. “I had the opportunity of seeing first hand, during those years, not only the transformation of industrial processes but the manner in which these processes are reorganized,” he remarked in the introduction to Labor and Monopoly Capital; “how the worker, systematically robbed of a craft heritage, is given little or nothing to take its place.”

For much of this time, Braverman was writing: book reviews, essays, screeds in the latest intra-Trotskyite brawl. But it was upon leaving the SWP that he turned his full attention to critical analysis, first as the editor (with Bert Cochran) of a short-lived but significant journal, American Socialist — an effort to strip the “Old” Left of its worn-out slogans and analyze the postwar conjuncture with fresh eyes — and then at Grove Press and finally Monthly Review Press. In essays written in and against the heady “golden age of capitalism” of the 1950s and early 1960s, he homed in on the two themes that would undergird Labor and Monopoly Capital. The first was bringing Marx’s critique of political economy to bear on the current social world; the second, understanding the process by which capital shaped the American working class.

These were urgent and related tasks. Capital seemed to be expanding into every corner of life, subjecting an ever greater variety of social roles to the logics and immiserations of proletarian labor. And yet “working class life is less described the more it has become widespread,” Braverman wrote in 1959. Socialists had abandoned Marx’s “critique of the capitalist mode of production” in favor of “a critique of capitalism as a mode of distribution” (a slippage that endures today). What would it mean to “revivify Marxist economic perspectives,” bringing them to bear on “the world around us as it is, not as it once was”? That is what Labor and Monopoly Capital proposed to do.

Braverman understood work and the working class as social processes, continually producing and produced by history. He rejected the contradictory and ahistorical analysis proffered by contemporary social science: the obsession with the better-educated “new working class,” the acceptance of alienation as “inevitable,” the measurement of worker consciousness through snapshot surveys. In its place, Braverman returned to the building blocks of the capitalist labor process. Labor and Monopoly Capital therefore began with the concepts of labor power and the manufacturing division of labor. The former set up the problem of capitalist management (the need to extract labor from workers within a given timeframe), while the latter partially solved it (by simplifying tasks and gathering workers under one roof). Both were precedents to the next advancement in capitalist control of labor, and an object of real ire for Braverman: the rise of Frederick Taylor’s scientific management, “the explicit verbalization of the capitalist mode of production.”

Scientific management was distinct from actual science in that it did not revolutionize tools or technology. Instead, it sought to perfect capital’s control over labor by monopolizing knowledge of the labor process. Management separated conception from execution, assigning to itself the work of science and depriving the worker of any planning capacity. This negated craft knowledge (a key element of worker power) and degraded work “almost to the level of labor in its animal form.” Braverman’s focus on this particular form of alienation was likely informed by his own experience as a craft worker.

The historical process of degradation was born with the detailed division of labor in early manufacturing, perfected by Taylorism in the late nineteenth century, and intensified with technological advancements like computing throughout the twentieth century. This last phase, the “scientific-technical revolution,” marked a qualitative change for the labor process. Rather than reappropriating worker knowledge, management produced its own knowledge, leaving the worker in “ignorance, incapacity, and thus a fitness for machine servitude.” Science itself became capital, an instrument bent toward management and production rather than human flourishing. For example, the advent of “numerical control” technology — in which preprogrammed software moved tools automatically — divided and simplified the machinist’s work, transforming what was once control and knowledge of the machine into its mere operation.

The constant advancement of machinery had a double effect. It both intensified managerial control and increased productivity, at once harnessing labor power and rendering it obsolete. As we will discuss below, Braverman recognized mechanization as a reality that would alter the occupational structure of the working class, and he sought to understand that new structure. But he also insisted that mechanization took a particular (and horrific) form under the social relations of scientific management.

More liberatory possibilities presented by machinery were “systematically thwarted” by management’s obsession with separating control and execution. Instead, the social relations of machinery were “best adapted to control of both the hand and the brain worker, best adapted to profitability, best adapted to everything but the needs of the people.”

In elaborating these processes — the stripping of knowledge from workers, then the creation of new knowledge from which workers were alienated from the start, and finally the domination of living by dead labor — Braverman effectively superimposed volume I of Capital onto the arc of the American Century. (In his forward, Monthly Review editor Paul Sweezy argued that it was necessary to read the two texts alongside one another.) Braverman’s fidelity to Marx’s magnum opus is remarkable. Labor and Monopoly Capital might even be read as an early, Americanized application of value-form Marxism, then nascent in Germany and now en vogue in Marxist circles.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Braverman’s insistence that capital, not labor, is the universal subject of the modern social world. This was not an easy move to make in 1974, when what Moishe Postone calls “traditional Marxism,” with its emphasis on the working class as a uniquely positioned agent for revolutionary change, remained dominant. Though Braverman held out hope for proletarian self-actualization — “I have every confidence in the revolutionary potential of the working classes,” he wrote in 1975 (note the plural) — the theme was conspicuously absent from Labor and Monopoly Capital. The Subject of the book, in every sense, was capital, an unending process that over time stripped labor of its concrete specificity, rendering it increasingly interchangeable and increasingly abstract. Braverman’s fellow radicals often reprimanded him for the lack of agency afforded to workers in his text. Doubtless that lack had something to do with
organized labor’s faltering power in his historical moment. But it was also based on a faithful reading of Marx’s later works.

Faithful, too, in Braverman’s insistence that the damage wrought by capital had nothing to do with workers getting paid less and less (which they weren’t) or with inequalities of wealth. The real problem was that under capitalism it “becomes essential for the capitalist that control over the labor process pass from the hands of the worker into his own.” The cruelty lay in the absence of control. “The transformation of working humanity into . . . an instrument of capital,” Braverman wrote, “is repugnant to the victims, whether their pay is high or low, because it violates human conditions of work.” The reference to Marx’s own “immiseration theory” in Capital — “in proportion as capital accumulates, the situation of the worker, be his payment high or low, must grow worse” — is hardly subtle.

But behind the degradation of labor lies an ironic point of light (or, depending on your disposition, an ongoing tragedy). Capital develops the possibility for its own transcendence through the creation of potentially emancipatory technologies. Here too Braverman drew directly from Capital. Under capitalism, he argued, “the remarkable development of machinery becomes, for most of the working population, the source not of freedom but of enslavement, not of mastery but of helplessness, and not of the broadening of the horizon of labor but of [its] confinement.” Compare  this passage to Marx’s commentary on machines in chapter fifteen of volume I:

Therefore since machinery itself shortens the hours of labour, but when employed by capital it lengthens them; since in itself it lightens labour, but when employed by capital it heightens its intensity . . . since in itself it increases the wealth of the producers, but in the hands of capital it makes them into paupers.

Braverman parallels Marx’s substance but also his form: the rhythmic give-and-take of a potential freedom coming into view even as it curdles into its opposite. In generating the possibility of a new social world even as it prevents that world from being realized, capital creates the grounds from which we might criticize it. That is, we can critique the present from the standpoint of an immanent (though not necessarily imminent) future, rather than a transcendental norm or a lost past.

An immanent critique of the present requires a clear-eyed analysis of the present. To that end, the second half of Labor and Monopoly Capital took stock of the recently transformed working class. As machine technology advanced, it created the conditions for the decline of manufacturing work. Braverman refused to lament this, avoiding the trap of industrial nostalgia that burdens the Left even today. Instead, he followed the history of manufacturing degradation to its unexpected conclusion: the rise of service degradation.

Drawing as ever on Marx, Braverman argued that capitalist accumulation affected working-class composition in two major ways. First, newly mechanized methods of production “set free” former industrial workers, creating a labor surplus that would tend to cluster in labor-intensive occupations. Second, newly accumulated capital, needing somewhere to go, “thrust itself frantically” into new branches of production, creating new occupations in the process. From these two tendencies, the rise of services followed. Capital expanded into all of society, transforming previously uncommodified relations (like recreation, amusement, security, and care) into service commodities produced by service workers.

Explicit in Braverman’s analysis was a normative argument against the encroachment of the market into family and community life. (The Frankfurt School and Monthly Review crowd might have inspired this line of thinking for Braverman, though it also strikes a reader as reminiscent of Karl Polanyi or anticipating Christopher Lasch.) The marketization of leisure resulted in “a standard of mediocrity and vulgarity which debases popular taste.” The atrophy of community life “leaves a void,” filled by institutions like schools and prisons that were “barbarous and oppressive.” While Braverman acknowledged that marketization resulted in part from increased efficiency and decreased costs, he argued that it also resulted from advertising, changing status expectations, and a deterioration of skills. That is, the commodification of daily life was not just a natural process in which technology created more free time but was instead a process created by capitalist  social relations that ultimately degraded social life.

Normativity aside, the commodification of daily life doubtlessly reconfigured the working class. The expansion of state institutions to fill the new social “void” meant job growth for prison guards, police, and social workers, as well as teachers. Meanwhile the growing hospitality and retail industries created “a huge specialized personnel whose function is nothing but cleaning.” Newly commodified service occupations were growing far more rapidly than employment as a whole. It was ironic, but also perfectly coherent, that in an “advanced” capitalist economy, labor was most concentrated in parts of the economy least impacted by the scientific-technical revolution, in occupations that had not yet been mechanized or never would be.

This process of labor accumulation was a gendered one. Braverman criticized the Department of Labor’s “custom of disregarding female employment, which is considered to be somehow temporary, incidental, and fortuitous, when it should actually be placed at the very center of all occupational studies today.” Gender operated on multiple levels of the new working class. It was women’s household production most recently commodified — the work of cleaning, caring, and feeding — that supplied capital with new opportunities of valorization. It was women who entered the workforce to do these now-commodified jobs, in part because of the declining participation of men in the workforce and in part because of a need for larger household incomes to purchase the service commodities once produced in the household. And it was largely women who were relegated to sub-subsistence-level waged work.

What is so helpful about Braverman’s account is that even as he explained the rise of services, he refused to naturalize that rise. The entrance of women into the workforce was not a simple product of progressive politics. The rise of services was not an evolution into a “higher” or more civilized economic form. Capitalist accumulation brought new occupational structures into being, but those occupational structures were not an inevitable or final form of work. On the contrary, they were continuously degraded and necessitated some kind of challenge.

But what is missing from Labor and Monopoly Capital is a clear direction for that challenge — an alternative to degradation — in the context of services. Regarding manufacturing, Braverman had a coherent demand: the reuniting of mental and manual work, of conception and execution, in combination with modern engineering and science. But since much service work remains immune to scientific progress, the “reintegration” of conception and execution is less relevant. The problem with cleaning work is not that a janitor does not understand the technologies of her cleaning supplies. The problem with prison work is not that guards do not have enough space to think about their work processes, but that the work processes themselves are socially destructive. For service work, then, the solutions to degradation seem to be of a different character.

In his analysis of the transition from artisanal to industrial labor, Braverman insisted that capital creates a hitherto unknown potential for human freedom even as it degrades our existence in the present. The history of capitalism was thus a tragedy and a comedy all at once. The mandate to labor to the rhythms of Taylorism was “a crime against the person and against humanity.” And yet it was part of a process that was “necessary for the progress of the human race,” a process that once underway was not only “inexorable” but, on the longest of views, good. Writing in 1984, Fredric Jameson implored Marxists to “somehow . . . lift our minds to a point at which it is possible to understand that capitalism is at one and the same time the best thing that has ever  happened to the human race, and the worst,” to think “catastrophe and progress all together.” Braverman did this.

But the rise of services seemed to push this “austere dialectical imperative” (to again quote Jameson) to its limits. Braverman tried to articulate the same give-and-take that he had applied to the rise of machines in industry. “The very social services which should facilitate social life and social solidarity 1748783512 have the opposite effect,” he wrote:

As the advances of modern household and service industries lighten the family labor, they increase the futility of family life; as they remove the burdens of personal relations, they strip away its affections; as they create an intricate social life, they rob it of every vestige of community and leave in its place the cash nexus.

Here Braverman repeats, in a new key, his careful mirroring of Marx’s description of machines in Capital. Capitalism creates the potential for “an intricate social life” of mutual interdependence, but in degraded form and to degrading ends. Yet even as Braverman gestured toward this interpretation of the service economy, he seemed unwilling to accept it. The commodification of care, the subsumption of our most human social relations into the logic of capital — was this development too one-sided, too totalizing, for the old dialectic to hold? Braverman never broached this  question explicitly. But it ran hot beneath his analysis.

If capital had ceased to point beyond itself, one solution was to turn back. The longing for a bygone past is a spectral presence in Labor and Monopoly Capital, never quite there but never quite absent either. “I was always a modernizer,” Braverman wrote in his introduction, an insistence that preceded an admission: “as I reread these pages, I find in them a sense not only of social outrage, but also perhaps of personal affront.” Still, though: “I hope no one draws from this the conclusion that my views are shaped by nostalgia for an age that cannot be recaptured. Rather, my views about work are governed by a nostalgia for an age that has not yet come into being.”

Braverman protested too much. If it is hard not to romanticize him, it is also hard to deny that he romanticized — against his intentions — a world of artisans and embedded communities, itself a part of early capitalism. “I think it is hard for people of the present student generation to understand,” he said in a lecture soon before his death. “When my generation was growing up, this wholesale destruction of a way of life was still going on.” Social outrage, personal affront: the line is thin. Fifty years on, though — as capital hollows out our social relations and sets our future ablaze — Braverman’s ambivalences are instructive for the anti-capitalism that our moment requires. Not just the transcendence of work through technology, but its redistribution  and abolition through political will. Perhaps the social revolution of the twenty-first century should take some of its poetry from the past.

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RKF Jr. May Have Just Ruined Our Best Weapon Against Bird Flu

(Composite / Photos: GettyImages / Shutterstock)

IMAGINE BEING HANDED the ultimate weapon to win a future war and throwing that weapon away.

That’s a fair description of what Robert F. Kennedy Jr. did last week when he canceled a $766 million government contract to develop a new bird flu vaccine.

The contract was with Moderna, the Massachusetts-based biotech company that developed and continues to produce one of the original COVID-19 shots. The Biden administration awarded the contract last year, through a special government program designed to fund preparation for future public health threats.

Moderna was trying to use its know-how from COVID to invent a vaccine platform it could deploy rapidly against several types of influenza, including the H5N1 bird flu—a version of which, if you haven’t heard, has spread to the United States and is ravaging poultry farms. But it’s not the price of eggs keeping infectious-disease doctors up at night. It’s the possibility that a strain mutates, jumps species, and ends up in humans, who then start transmitting it to each other.

It’s happened before, in mostly isolated outbreaks, with mortality rates that reached 50 percent. That dwarfs the comparable figure for COVID-19, which in most countries was in the low single digits and yet still killed more than 7 million people around the world, including more than a million in the United States.

That death toll would have been even higher if not for speedy development of COVID vaccines, including Moderna’s, whose secret sauce is mRNA technology that generally allows for much quicker production. That’s why two of the scientists most responsible for the breakthrough won the Nobel Prize in Medicine. And it’s why that bird flu contract went to Moderna, whose early tests on the bird flu vaccine have already produced promising results.

But the contract was through the Department of Health and Human Services, which thanks to Donald Trump is under the leadership of Kennedy, the longtime vaccination critic whose egregious lies about the COVID shot include grossly exaggerating the prevalence of side effects and claiming it offers no protection against severe disease.

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Kennedy didn’t trot out any of these lines when canceling the Moderna contract. In fact, he didn’t say anything at all. But an HHS spokesperson told reporters like me that the Moderna decision was “about safety, integrity, and trust” and described mRNA technology as “under-tested”—even though the mRNA COVID shots went through extensive, randomized clinical trials before approval, and have been closely monitored for adverse effects ever since.

That last part is no small thing. Ashish Jha, dean of the Brown University School of Public Health, told me in a phone interview he estimates as many as 1 billion people have gotten at least one dose of an mRNA vaccine, with only rare reports of serious side effects.

“I would argue that this has been extraordinarily well studied,” Jha said, “and turns out to be one of the safest vaccine platforms we have.”

Jha, who served as the government’s COVID-19 coordinator during the Biden administration, went on to call the under-testing argument “absurd.” That’s pretty much the consensus among mainstream scientists, as I heard when I put the question to several more of them.

Adam Lauring, chief of infectious diseases at the University of Michigan and a leading researcher into the biology and evolution of viruses, said “these vaccines have probably been studied more intensively over the last five years than pretty much any other vaccines.” Adam Ratner, a nationally recognized pediatric infectious diseases physician in New York City, told me via email that the “mRNA COVID vaccines have been extensively tested and have an excellent safety record.”

Ratner, who is the author of the book Booster Shots, said he could not fathom why Kennedy would be cutting off development of a treatment that might offer the surest, quickest way to prevent a potentially catastrophic spread of bird flu—let alone slow progress on a treatment that holds out the promise of fighting a lot more than infectious disease.

“This decision,” Ratner said, “represents an unforced error of potentially epic proportions.”

CANCELLATION OF THE MODERNA CONTRACT was not the only vaccine-related news that Kennedy made last week. He also announced a major shift in the official recommendation about who should get COVID booster shots and when.

Unlike the Moderna announcement, however, that decision may have been as remarkable for the way it was made and publicized as for what it actually dictated.

The announcement came on Tuesday morning, when Kennedy said in a 60-second social media video that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) would stop recommending boosters for healthy children and healthy non-elderly adults, including pregnant women.

The decision had been rumored for weeks, and even many of those who would prefer to keep the old recommendation for kids concede the risk-versus-reward calculation is open to debate. But the case for pregnant women getting boosters is a lot more clear-cut, as my Bulwark colleague Andrew Egger noted last week.

Studies have linked COVID during pregnancy to pre-term births, preeclampsia, and other complications, as well as long-term damage to the mother’s kidneys, heart, and other systems. Vaccinating pregnant mothers is the surest way to protect newborns and infants, who are highly vulnerable to infection and its most serious effects—and who, for the first few months of life, rely on whatever antibodies they got in utero because they cannot get the shots.

Kennedy’s announcement prompted a blistering statement from the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, plus lots of questions about exactly who made the decision and why—especially because two top FDA officials had indicated in a much-ballyhooed article a week earlier that their agency still thought pregnancy was a valid reason for boosters.

“If you look at the data and the science, it does show that COVID vaccination is important for pregnant women—we should be doing everything that we can to not only prevent COVID, but mitigating the severity of disease for people who still get it,” Krutika Kuppalli, a U.S.-based infectious-disease physician and researcher who worked on COVID response for the World Health Organization, told me in a phone interview. “I’m not really understanding how this decision came about.”

Normally, CDC issues vaccine guidelines by following a clear, methodical process that starts with government scientists at CDC and other agencies collecting and analyzing data, which then goes to an advisory committee of outside scientists who meet and discuss the evidence in public. The CDC director presides over those meetings and makes a recommendation, which in turn requires a (usually perfunctory) signoff from the HHS secretary.

That clearly didn’t happen here, because the advisory committee hasn’t met yet. Even if it had, there would have been no permanent or acting CDC director to preside or follow up with a recommendation. As best as anybody can tell—and, yes, it’s totally bonkers that this is even an open question—the person currently performing the CDC director’s duties is the chief of staff, who among other things is not a scientist. He’s a lawyer with a background in aviation.

That might explain why, as the Washington Post reported, CDC staff learned about the decision the same way the public did: by watching that Tuesday video, in which Kennedy was, bizarrely, flanked by directors of two other health agencies but nobody from the CDC.

WHAT CAME NEXT was even weirder.

Two days went by with no more official communication, except for a “directive” with Kennedy’s signature that circulated internally and eventually landed in the inboxes of reporters like me. It was just one page without HHS letterhead or other trappings of official documentation, and it contained what looked to me like a typo that seemed to contradict Kennedy’s central message.

CDC finally updated its online vaccine information on Thursday night, though the new material didn’t line up with what Kennedy had outlined in the video. Under the new guidelines, CDC has completely withdrawn the recommendation of COVID vaccine boosters for pregnant women, but it has given some support for boosters among healthy kids, albeit with a caveat suggesting parents consult their doctors through “shared decision-making.” CDC has done so even though the case for giving boosters to healthy kids is weaker than it is for giving boosters to pregnant women.

And just to make things even more confusing, the HHS media office has responded to media queries (again, including mine) by saying “the old COVID-19 vaccine recommendations for healthy children under 18 and for pregnant women have been removed from the CDC vaccine schedule.” That makes it sound like CDC is treating the two groups the same way, when the online guidance for them is plainly different.

The ambiguous, conflicting messages and shambolic, unprofessional presentations will not surprise you if you have been watching the Trump administration closely these past few months—or if you read last week’s exposé by two NOTUS reporters showing Kennedy’s highly touted “Make America Healthy Again” report contained bogus and sometimes misleading citations.

But the saga around the boosters provides something new: the clearest evidence yet that Kennedy was lying when he promised congressional overseers—and the American people—that his goals were to increase transparency and scientific accountability rather than impose his own agenda. “I don’t think people should be taking medical advice from me,” he told a House committee in May.

“What you have here is the secretary—not even the CDC director, because there is no CDC director—the secretary jumping in and saying the way he interprets the science is X, and so he’s going to make a decision unilaterally to preempt any decision or recommendation that [the advisory committee] would make,” University of Michigan law professor Sam Bagenstos—who served as HHS general counsel during the Biden administration—told me. “That’s a completely irregular process.”

The full effect of the revised COVID booster guidance is impossible to know at this point—in part because its meaning still isn’t totally clear. But there’s a real possibility that it will affect people’s access to the vaccines, making it difficult for people who want or need them to get them.

The “shared decision” recommendation for kids would be enough to keep boosters on the list of vaccines insurers must cover, under the Affordable Care Act’s preventative care requirement, experts told me. But it could at the very least complicate the process for people who would get shots at pharmacies, where consultations aren’t always easy.

As for the lack of guidance on pregnant women, that could give insurers more freedom to drop full coverage. On the other hand, other CDC webpages continued to recommend the shot for pregnant women as late as Friday night. And some insurers might opt to keep covering the boosters regardless of the recommendation—especially for pregnant women, given the high cost of treating serious COVID complications should they occur.

But CDC recommendations have implications that go beyond legal requirements for insurers. They influence public attitudes. CDC recommendations also serve as guidance for physicians all over the country, many of whom don’t have time—or specific technical background—to spend days weighing research evidence on their own.

“If you’re a primary-care physician and you’re trying to decide what to recommend to your patient, it gets to the point where you can’t necessarily trust the recommendations that are being made by HHS and CDC anymore,” Bagenstos said.

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And even for experts following the research more closely, Jha said, “the usual process has a few advantages, because it’s super transparent. Everybody has seen the data. You can disagree with the decisions, but at least you’ve seen the data on which it is based, and the CDC scientists have had a chance to share that data in a public function.”

In short, Kennedy is introducing more uncertainty into everyday medicine while undercutting CDC’s institutional credibility. And he’s doing so in a way that could render this particular decision vulnerable to a court challenge, Bagenstos noted, because administrative law prohibits federal agencies like CDC from arbitrary or capricious action. That’s one reason officials deliberate so methodically and so publicly—or did in non-Trumpian times, at any rate.

But litigation takes time. And even if Kennedy’s guidance on COVID boosters eventually falls in court, he’s sent a message about how unreliable federal support for vaccines has become and will be. The companies that manufacture vaccines are sure to notice.

They have other ways to make money, after all, and other places to do it too. That includes China, whose government has been investing heavily in biotech at precisely the time when—thanks again to Trump and Kennedy—the U.S. government is cutting back support for medical research. Put it all together, and it’s easy to see how vaccine development and production could slow or move overseas, or maybe both.

With any of those scenarios, Americans could find themselves waiting longer for help in a future pandemic. And if it’s bird flu or a new COVID strain or some other yet-to-be-seen pathogen, waiting longer for a vaccine could mean not surviving the outbreak at all.

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